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ABSTRACT
This paper deploys a discursive institutionalist framework to explore how 
various categories of ideas – from ideology, to programme, to policy – interact 
to shape the planning policymaking process. Using the emergence of the 2012 
National Planning Policy Framework in England as a case study, the role of the 
political ideology of the leadership of a political party (as distinct from, but 
related to, the broader category of ‘neoliberalism’) in shaping and legitimising 
planning reform is analysed. It is shown that it is not only the political ideolo-
gical legacy of a political party and how it melds with the prevailing paradig-
matic orthodoxy (such as neoliberalism) that matters in framing planning 
reform, but that the way in which ideas are communicated and consulted on 
in the policymaking process is also significant.
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Introduction
Although English post-war planning has always had a market-supportive role, its history since the 
early 1980s can be read as a series of attempts by governments to more closely align its institutional 
design with market forces (e.g. Allmendinger, 2016; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012; Thornley, 1991). 
Allmendinger and Haughton (2013) contend that this has been a story of the neoliberalisation of 
planning via a series of periods marked by shifts in the scalar distribution of planning powers and 
the degree and design of planning regulation, but connected via broad continuities derived from 
“the role of neoliberalism as a political-economic governance ideology” (p. 23) and an attendant 
focus on the role of planning to promote growth. Lord and Tewdwr-Jones (2014) broadly agree with 
this analysis, arguing that English planning has undergone successive waves of neoliberal reform 
that have been framed by governments as necessary to ‘fix’ planning, which is criticised as a “chronic 
obstacle to growth” (p. 346). This ‘scapegoating’ of planning as a bureaucratic barrier that impedes 
beneficial market-driven development outcomes has been characteristic of neoliberal planning 
reform in many jurisdictions (Gunder, 2016). However, the precise form this neoliberalisation of 
planning has taken across the globe is by no means universally the same (Baeten, 2018). Various 
analyses explore how the cultural, political, economic or legal legacies in individual jurisdictions 
have melded with a general governmental neoliberal rationality to produce distinct waves of 
planning reform that nevertheless are argued to share family resemblances, such as 
a prioritisation of economic growth, efficiency and competitiveness over social goals (e.g. Davoudi 
et al., 2020; Inch, 2018; Miessner, 2020; Olesen, 2014). Although not the only way of approaching the 
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concept (Newman, 2014), the accounts referenced here generally acknowledge the role of neoli-
beralism as a form of ideology that frames, conditions and legitimises neoliberalisation processes 
with varying outcomes. Such studies are therefore generally careful to avoid the implication that 
neoliberalism is an ideational monolith and instead emphasise its contingent and variegated 
expressions while seeking to trace its influence via similarities and continuities across scales, spaces 
and periods.
In a comparison of neoliberalisation processes and spatial planning in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, Waterhout et al. (2013) argue that what makes the English experience distinctive is that 
it is prone to “more radical or disruptive decisions” (p. 157) concerning planning reform. This paper 
investigates one particular period of ‘disruptive decisions’ in England to examine the role of political 
ideology and associated ideas in influencing the policymaking process that resulted in the National 
Planning Policy Framework (‘NPPF’) in 2012. This set out a new planning framework for England and 
was a key output of the post-2010 Conservative-led coalition government’s political ideological 
project for planning at the time. Upon the publication of the draft consultation NPPF in 2011, it was 
seen by some as a means by which central government could indirectly compel local authorities and 
local communities to consent to more housing to support economic growth in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. This central state disciplining of local authorities for perceived failures in plan- 
making and housing delivery was in tension with a parallel emphasis on ‘localism’ and community 
empowerment. The draft NPPF became the focus of a vociferous and public dispute between the 
Conservative ministers with responsibility for planning, and the Conservative Party’s own supporters 
in both Parliament and rural areas who were concerned about the impact of new housing devel-
opment on the English countryside. This disruptive controversy seemed to reflect the tensions in the 
ideology of the Conservative Party as it related to planning at the time. It is a timely moment to 
revisit this topic because, at the time of writing, the government is once again considering 
introducing major reforms of the planning system in England (Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government [MHCLG], 2020). As with the original NPPF consultation, the potential impact 
of those elements of the proposed reforms that are aimed at increasing housing delivery have been 
the focus of a political backlash against the government from its own members and supporters who 
are concerned about the impact of new housing development on rural shires (Walker, 2020).
The paper takes a more fine-grained view of ideology than that offered by an abstract conception 
of neoliberalism. Following Freeden (1996), ideology is here defined sociologically (rather than 
necessarily pejoratively) as a form of group political thinking that can be analysed in terms of 
a morphology of contested political concepts (such as liberty, equality and justice) that are 
articulated differently in various political ideologies and by which groups interpret and attempt to 
exert control over political reality. The paper builds on previous work examining the relationship 
between the political ideology of the Conservative Party (which was a distinct amalgam of neolib-
eral and conservative concepts) and planning reform in England after 2010 (e.g. Inch & Shepherd, 
2020; Lord & Tewdwr-Jones, 2018; Tait & Inch, 2016) and complements two previous papers in which 
I examined the relationship between the particular political ideological orientation of English 
governments and national planning reform (Shepherd, 2018, 2020). These studies explored the 
relationship between contesting political ideologies and national planning policy and law, and 
argued that institutional change in planning is “partly a function of ideological competition over the 
proper meanings of the concepts which it shares with competing ideologies” (Shepherd, 2020, p. 7). 
However, the national policymaking process by which ideas that are related to abstract political 
ideologies found their way into the institution of English planning to create change in the coalition 
period has rarely been explored (although see Lord & Tewdwr-Jones, 2018).
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A discursive institutionalist framework (Schmidt, 2008a, 2008b, 2014) is deployed to address this 
lacuna. Discursive institutionalism differentiates between different levels of ideas – from deep philo-
sophical or ideological ideas, to meso-level programmatic ideas, to more dynamic policy ideas – to 
examine how they frame and legitimise institutional change. Importantly, analysis of the agency of 
ideas entails study of how they are communicated. By using a discursive institutionalist framework, this 
paper explores how the political ideology of the Conservative Party leadership provided a broad 
legitimising, yet contradictory, conceptual frame for its programme for planning and the policy ideas 
enshrined in the NPPF, as well as how the discursive strategies by which these ideas were commu-
nicated in the policymaking process influenced the final document. Following the levels of ideas from 
abstract ideology to the passage of specific policy ideas through the fraught process which resulted in 
the NPPF, the analysis explores how ideology is not totalising but must ‘suture together’ contradictory 
arguments (Hall, 2011, p. 713) and seek to exert control over political meanings when challenged.
This paper therefore makes a theoretical contribution by deploying a discursive institutionalist 
framework combined with a morphological understanding of ideology to explore how various ‘levels’ 
of ideas – from ideology, to programme, to policy – interact to shape the planning policymaking 
process within the broader context of the neoliberalisation of planning. A distinction is drawn between 
neoliberalism as an overarching paradigm and the neoliberalisation of the ideologies of particular 
political parties in order to explore the role of these ideologies in accommodating neoliberal impera-
tives in different ways while being reshaped by, as well as reshaping, them. The various ways in which 
the distinct ideological traditions of political parties meld with neoliberal impulses are presented as 
being one factor contributing to the variegated nature of neoliberalism, with particular implications for 
changes in planning programmes and policies in different political and cultural contexts. By deploying 
this theoretical framework in an analysis of the emergence of the NPPF in England, this paper not only 
focuses analytical attention on the role of the morphology of the particular political ideology of 
a political party (as distinct from, but related to, the broader category of ‘neoliberalism’) in shaping and 
legitimising planning reform, but also on how the ways in which associated ideas are communicated 
can significantly influence the policymaking process to the extent that aspects of the legitimising 
political ideology are challenged. It is shown, therefore, that it is not only the political ideological 
legacy of a political party and how it melds with the prevailing paradigmatic orthodoxy (such as 
neoliberalism) that matters in framing planning reform, but that the way in which ideas are commu-
nicated and consulted on in the policymaking process is also significant. Although the paper focuses 
on the NPPF in England to explore these themes, the theoretical framework has potential to be 
deployed in other contexts to explore the relationship between ideology and planning in jurisdictions 
with different political, ideological and planning traditions.
The next part of the paper briefly summarises the discursive institutionalist theoretical frame-
work. This is followed by a summary of the programme of planning reform that was developed by 
the Conservative Party in the years leading up to the 2010 general election. The process of the 
drafting and publication of the 2012 NPPF is then examined through an account of the discursive 
interactions that shaped this process. There then follows some critical reflections on the nature of 
institutional change for planning at the time.
Ideas and Institutional Change
Discursive institutionalism1 is an umbrella term for forms of institutionalist analysis that explicitly 
acknowledge the role of ideas in shaping institutions and influencing institutional change (Béland, 
2009; Blyth, 1997; Campbell, 1998; P. Hall, 1993). That any such acknowledgment should be 
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regarded as remarkable enough to require its own category may seem surprising. However, 
discursive institutionalism is part of a wider ‘turn to ideas’ in political science, which should be 
seen in the context of a reaction against the suspicion of interpretive forms of analysis present in 
some schools of the discipline that emphasise rational calculations or material interests over 
ideational processes2 (Blyth, 2013; Gofas & Hay, 2010b; Béland & Cox, 2011, p. 6). Through turning 
to ideas and how they are communicated, discursive institutionalist analyses seek to overcome the 
more static framing of other forms of new institutionalism which have been criticised for their 
difficulties with satisfactorily explaining institutional change (Thelen & Conran, 2016).
Ideas in discursive institutionalist studies are generally held to operate at three levels of general-
ity with each level performing differing roles (Mehta, 2011). Schmidt (2008a, 2008b, 2014) describes 
these levels of idea as policy, programme and philosophy. Policy ideas are specific policies or policy 
solutions. Policy programmes (or programmatic ideas) define the problems, normative goals and the 
methods to be applied. Philosophical ideas are the public philosophies, worldviews or ideologies 
that frame the policy programmes and policies. For Schmidt (2016), forms of neoliberalism equate to 
the philosophical or ‘background’ level of ideas which may find expression via government pro-
grammes and policies, although there are many other potential candidates depending on the 
empirical context, such as the belief that local government is more attuned to local needs than 
more remote tiers of government (Mehta, 2011, p. 27).
However, this kind of framing does not clearly distinguish between the broader saturation of political 
ideas through the fabric of society so that they become part of ‘common sense’ as described by the 
concept of hegemony – defined here as “a central system of practices, meanings and values, which we 
can properly call dominant and effective” (Williams, 2005, pp. 37–38) – and how variegated forms of 
neoliberalism arise via a melding of more or less hegemonic neoliberal impulses with the distinct political 
ideological traditions of political parties. This paper therefore distinguishes between the broader idea-
tional context of neoliberalism as the dominant political and economic paradigm, and the particular 
political ideology of the Conservative Party leadership in the early coalition government period (see also 
Inch & Shepherd, 2020). This is to examine how the political ideology of the Conservative Party of the 
time was in support of, and in tension with, aspects of the neoliberal paradigm with significant 
implications for the programmes and policies of planning reform of the period.
If discursive institutionalism calls on ideas to help explain institutional change, then it must 
provide an account of how change occurs. Schmidt (2002), following P. Hall (1993), identifies 
a typology of ideational and institutional change whereby ‘renewal’ occurs when new policy 
instruments and policy ideas are introduced but without significant change to the programmatic 
objectives and ideals of policy, and ‘recasting’ occurs when new policy instruments are accompa-
nied by adjustments to the programmatic objectives but no major adjustment in core philosophical 
ideals (see Table 1). Where there is change to policies, programmatic objectives as well as over-
arching ideals or philosophy, this is described as revolutionary or ‘third order’ change. The example 
provided by Schmidt and Hall of third order change is the move from a Keynesian to monetarist and 
neoliberal paradigm for economic policy which occurred in the UK in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Table 1. Orders of institutional change.
Type of change Renewed Recast Revolutionary
Policy ideas and instruments Changed Changed Changed
Policy programmes and objectives Same Changed Changed
Policy philosophical core Same Same Changed
(Source: adapted from Schmidt, 2002, p. 223).
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However, this kind of framing does not clearly differentiate between possible levels of abstrac-
tion – is the change being analysed occurring at the national government level, regional level or 
within individual policy areas, and how do these various dynamics of change interrelate? This paper 
therefore focuses on planning as a substantive national policy area that underwent adjustment in 
response to the political ideology of the Conservative Party of the time. The degree of change in 
planning (at least at the national institutional level) is here analysed in terms of adjustments to its 
individual policies (such as those represented by the NPPF) and to the broad programmatic 
objectives for planning (such as to give more planning powers to local neighbourhoods), within 
the context of the overarching political ideology of the Conservative Party of the time, and all within 
a broader framing of the neoliberalisation of British politics since the 1970s.
For changes in ideas and institutions to occur, the content of ideas must obviously be commu-
nicated. For Schmidt, ideas tend to be communicated via two types of discourse: coordinative 
discourse, which is that of those “at the center of policy construction who are involved in the 
creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas”, and ‘communicative 
discourse’, which “consists of the individuals and groups involved in the presentation, deliberation, 
and legitimation of political ideas to the general public” (Schmidt, 2008b, p. 310). Schmidt (2002) 
argues that the coherence of a government’s communicative discourse is a factor in how persuasive 
it is and, therefore, its degree of public support (p. 235).
The remainder of the paper will examine the interaction of the various levels of ideas comprising 
the Conservative Party’s early programme for planning reform in the years following the 2010 
general election with a particular focus on the policymaking process that resulted in the 2012 NPPF. 
Political speeches, policy documents and parliamentary debates were analysed to identify the key 
conceptual elements of the political ideology of the Conservative Party of the time. A series of 
Conservative Party policy papers (Conservative Party, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) and associated speeches 
were examined to identify some of the programmatic ideas for planning, which were found by 
looking at how the problems were defined and what broad goals were presented. To examine how 
these then shaped the policymaking process surrounding the adoption of the NPPF 2012, 28 semi- 
structured interviews were carried out in 2015 with Conservative Party and Liberal Democrat 
politicians, policymakers, policy advisers, planning practitioners, think tanks, campaigners and 
professional groups. The interviews were transcribed and then coded and analysed using NVivo 
software to identify rationales for coordinative and communicative strategies and how these 
influenced the passage of ideas into national policy. The various versions of the NPPF were also 
analysed to identify shifts in policy wording.
Ideational Change: Moving through the Levels
The following account explores the dynamics of the relevant ideological and programmatic ideas 
that would help shape the Conservative-led coalition government’s agenda for the introduction of 
the NPPF in England. The changes to English town and country planning introduced by the 
Conservative-led coalition government after 2010 should be seen in the longer-term historical 
context of the evolution of British politics over the previous thirty years.3 Following the ‘paradigm 
shift’ (P. Hall, 1993) represented by the neoliberalisation of economic policy by the Conservative 
Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, the centrist wing of the traditionally 
leftist Labour Party gained ascendancy in the mid-1990s partly thanks to a strategy of combining 
a self-espoused form of democratic socialism with liberalism (Blair, 1998). This enabled the party to 
occupy a neoliberalised centre ground by claiming that social democratic ends could be achieved 
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via a dynamic economy supported by an enabling state (rather than an overbearing redistributive 
state) while differentiating itself from the individualism of the Conservative Party and its apparent 
denial of communitarian ends (Heffernan, 2000). Following a general election victory in 1997, the 
rebranded New Labour in some respects continued with the broadly neoliberal agenda set by the 
previous Conservative governments (Hall, 2017a). For planning, this meant a continuing focus on 
facilitating economic prosperity (alongside social and environmental objectives), with a parallel 
critique of the planning system as being too slow and bureaucratic (Department for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions [DTLR], 2001): “Without an effective planning system we risk con-
straining the economy, at a cost to everyone in the UK” (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister [ODPM], 
2002, n.p.).
However, this neoliberal impulse was tempered by linking it with an ostensibly social democratic 
conception of community whose collectivist connotations helped to contrast New Labour with 
a ‘harsh and uncaring’ Conservative Party (Bevir, 2000, p. 295). This deployment of the concept of 
community also brought a discursive emphasis on devolving power from the central state: 
“Government cannot achieve social inclusion for people, but it can help them achieve it for 
themselves, by transferring power and opportunity to local communities” (Labour Party, 2001, 
p. 24). This was linked with regional development to help more evenly distribute opportunity to 
“ensure that all regions share in the nation’s wealth and prosperity” (Department for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions [DTLR], 2002, p. 9) and was institutionalised in the planning system 
through the introduction of statutory regional plans via 2004 legislation. These plans would be 
prepared by regional planning bodies and were intended to “reflect regional diversity and specific 
regional needs” and would be “integrated with other regional strategies” (ODPM, 2002, n.p.) such as 
the economic strategies prepared by Regional Development Agencies which had previously been 
introduced by New Labour. However, despite their discursive connection with devolving power, 
these statutory regional plans did constitute a degree of central state oversight and were criticised 
by some in the Conservative Party as being a statist imposition on local areas (HC Deb, 2002 col 740). 
The perceived ‘imposition’ via regional plans of housing targets on local authorities was particularly 
unpopular (Conservative Party, 2009a, 2010). New Labour’s regional plans were thus framed by its 
ideological opponents as a product of an overbearing central state.
The Conservative Party remained in opposition until the 2010 general election when, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, it formed a coalition government with the more traditionally 
centrist Liberal Democrats. The new Prime Minister David Cameron had, over the preceding four and 
a half years, ideologically repositioned the Conservative Party so that it could challenge New Labour 
by presenting a form of ostensibly ‘compassionate conservatism’ (Dorey, 2007). It was hoped that by 
(re)acknowledging the importance of society in conservative thought, the Conservative Party could 
present itself as being more socially aware than in the past. It was thought that this would also 
address the fears of those who felt that the institutions and local identities traditionally valued by 
conservatives were threatened by the neoliberalisation of conservative ideals over the preceding 
decades (Blond, 2009, 2010; Gray, 1997). The resultant ideological project sought to constrain the 
destabilising dynamism theoretically posed by neoliberalised economic agents “floating freely, 
untrammelled by ties, culture or history” (Willetts, 1997, p. 82) by situating the individual within 
a community network bound by shared institutions: “For a Conservative just to celebrate the 
freedom of the individual would be missing something equally important. There is not just ‘me’; 
there is also ‘we’” (Willetts, 2005). However, unlike New Labour’s strategic central state oversight in 
support of community development and equality of opportunity (despite framing this in terms of 
devolving power), the Cameronite ideological project was suspicious of what its proponents saw as 
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state intrusion into local communities and identities. The Cameronite project was therefore osten-
sibly focused on creating the ‘freedom’ perceived as necessary for local communities (or ‘neighbour-
hoods’ in the new ideological framing) to take responsibility for their own development by reducing 
the size of the state so as to apparently reduce ‘top down’ and ‘undemocratic’ imposition of state 
power: “We are the only party believing that if you give people freedom and responsibility, they will 
grow stronger and society will grow stronger” (Cameron, 2005).
The preceding summary has briefly explored how the ideology of Cameronite conservatism 
sought to combat New Labour’s prior electoral success by maintaining a Thatcherite focus on 
liberty, but anchoring it to a conservative conception of community (reframed via the concept of 
the neighbourhood) and ostensibly rejecting New Labour’s concept of the active state. New Labour 
had itself been a political and ideological project designed to occupy neoliberalised Conservative 
Party electoral and ideational territory by articulating a positive conception of liberty and the 
transformative power of the economy, but connecting them with ostensibly social democratic 
concepts (such as community and an active state). In this way, both party ideologies acknowledged 
their differing traditions while responding to the challenge they presented to each other within 
a broadly neoliberal political culture to result in different, yet neoliberalised, political and ideological 
formations. The differing conceptual articulations of, and contradictions within, these party ideolo-
gical projects had very different implications for planning.
The institution of planning was indeed a key target for reshaping by Conservative Party ideology, 
given its connection with deeply political questions concerning the relationship between private 
property rights and the state. This manifested in a number of programmatic ideas for planning that 
defined the problems to be solved and the associated normative goals. These were set out in a series 
of policy papers (Conservative Party, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). The key ideas for the topic of this paper 
were to simplify the planning system and make it more efficient, to promote growth through the 
planning system, to give more planning powers to communities and neighbourhoods and to 
abolish regional planning. These programmatic ideas were shaped by the broader Cameronite 
ideological amalgam, with its emphasis on personal liberty tempered by neighbourhood commu-
nity identity and the rejection of too much ‘top down’ state ‘interference’ in property and develop-
ment markets.
However, while the Conservative Party had spent some considerable effort developing an 
ideological project that would reshape planning, the same cannot be said of its eventual coalition 
partners the Liberal Democrats. There were no Liberal Democrat equivalents to the Conservative 
Party policy papers. However, the Liberal Democrats’ manifesto did exhibit a degree of overlap with 
the Conservative Party in terms of the relationship between central government and local commu-
nities, particularly through an apparently mutual focus on abolishing regional tiers of planning 
governance and introducing greater localism. The foreword to the Coalition agreement between 
the two parties duly stated: “As our parties have worked together it has become increasingly clear to 
us that, although there are differences, there is also common ground” (HM Government, 2010, p. 7). 
The lack of preparation of detailed policy ideas for planning on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, and 
the degree to which there was general alignment between the two parties concerning the pro-
grammatic idea to empower local communities, combined with the fact that the Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government and all the planning ministers were Conservative during 
the coalition government, helps to explain the degree to which the Conservative Party was able to 
set the policy agenda for planning reform once in power.
Despite being presented by the Conservative Party as a coherent programme of reform for 
planning, some of its ideas were in conflict (Tait & Inch, 2016). This is evident in the interaction 
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between the neoliberal imperative to develop more housing for home ownership4 which was to be 
framed as being particularly pressing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (HM Government, 
2011), and the localist imperative for decentralisation and giving more power to local neighbour-
hoods who may not actually wish to see more housing development in their areas. The NPPF 
became a key area of contestation as the Conservative-led government struggled to reconcile these 
tensions in its own ideological framework with regards to planning.
Having set the context at the ideological and programmatic level of ideas of the coalition period 
of English politics, the following section ‘tells the story’ of the process of drafting and publication of 
the 2012 NPPF,5 which would be a carrier for various policies intended to help deliver 
a contradictory programme for planning. By prompting us to pay attention to the discursive 
interactions of the policymaking process, a discursive institutionalist approach encourages us to 
be aware of the influence of discursive strategy and the strategic deployment of ideas in influencing 
institutional change as much as the content of ideas themselves.
The NPPF Policymaking Process
Upon negotiating the formation of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in the 
immediate aftermath of the general election in May 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron appointed 
his ministers. These included Greg Clark as Minister for Decentralisation and Planning at the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (‘DCLG’) and George Osborne as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer based at HM Treasury (‘the Treasury’). Osborne was focused on ensuring that the 
country would be able to develop its way out of the slump of the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis by freeing up private enterprise and reducing public spending. For the Treasury, a key role of 
planning was to facilitate this. The Treasury’s Plan for Growth at the time therefore stated: “To make 
it easier . . . to get planning consent, the Government is introducing a powerful new presumption in 
favour of sustainable development so that the default answer to development is ‘yes’” (HM Treasury 
and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills [BIS], 2011, p. 18).
Drafting national planning policy would usually be the responsibility of civil servants based at 
DCLG. However, in October 2010, Clark invited four individuals from outside government to come 
together to form a Practitioners Advisory Group (‘PAG’) whose responsibility it would be to produce 
an initial draft (‘PAG draft’) which would then be used by government to inform its official draft NPPF 
(Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG], 2011a). The PAG included 
a Conservative local politician, a planning consultant, a senior executive at a volume housebuilder 
and a representative from the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (‘RSPB’). By appointing the 
PAG, Clark was seeking to circumvent the institutionalised thinking of DCLG civil servants and to 
create a document that would not be overly constrained by ideational legacies from the New Labour 
era, could disrupt the path dependence of old ideas relating to planning and create a space through 
which new ideas could be more easily embedded in the institution (Policy Advisor A, personal 
communication, 2 October 2015; Policy Advisor D, personal communication, 13 October 2015).
However, the preparation of the PAG draft was not conducted in complete isolation from civil 
servants – civil service secretarial support was provided to the group via whom suggestions could 
be made regarding drafting, and PAG draft text was shared with civil servants for comment. 
Nevertheless, by giving primary responsibility for the initial drafting to the PAG, Clark had 
departed from usual practice and this resulted in a radically shorter document than a rough 
draft of approximately 200 pages that had been prepared by civil servants in response to the 
content of the Conservative policy papers in preparation for a possible Conservative government 
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(Slade, 2018). The PAG submitted its draft to the government in May 2011. Key elements included 
the introduction of a “presumption in favour of sustainable development”, the requirement that 
“local plans should be prepared on the basis that objectively assessed needs are met” and an 
emphasis on “promoting positive strategies for environmental enhancement” (Practitioners 
Advisory Group [PAG], 2011).
The government published its official draft NPPF in July 2011 (DCLG, 2011a) after a coordinative 
‘write round’ process whereby other government departments could seek to make changes. The 
resulting draft was 58 pages long and “looked remarkably like the PAG version” (Rutter, 2012, p. 13). 
However, there was a stronger emphasis on economic growth and the insertion of the phrase 
“decision takers at every level should assume that the default answer to development proposals is 
‘yes’” (DCLG, 2011a, p. 5). This language echoed the passage in the Treasury’s Plan for Growth quoted 
above and was indeed a result of Treasury influence with that department “wanting to make sure that 
[DCLG was] taking this opportunity as much as possible” and pushing the document in a more “radical 
and more pro-growth” direction (Policy Advisor A, personal communication, 2 October 2015). The draft 
NPPF went out for public consultation on 25 July until 17 October 2011. DCLG received over 16,000 
responses to the consultation as well as over 328,000 signatures in support of various petitions 
concerning the proposals (Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG], 2012). The 
large number of responses in part reflects the public controversy which ensued in the communicative 
sphere and the government’s failure to include potential opposition groups effectively in the initial 
coordinative discursive process which produced the draft.
Very quickly after the publication of the draft NPPF, the government was subjected to an organised 
campaign by the conservation, countryside and environmental protection lobby. This comprised an 
alliance of interests including the National Trust (a conservation and national heritage organisation), 
the RSPB and the Campaign to Protect Rural England (‘CPRE’). These groups were given platforms in 
the media, most notably by the usually Conservative-supporting Telegraph newspaper, which 
launched a prominent campaign called ‘Hands Off Our Land’. This alliance largely reflected ‘middle 
England’ and was keen to project a middle-class construction of the countryside and the threats posed 
to it by new development. It was, therefore, a national expression of a rural preservationist discourse 
that has also been shown to play out through local plan-making processes (see Abram et al., 1996).
Key concerns of these groups included the perceived ‘inadequate and unclear’ definition of 
sustainable development, that the presumption in favour of sustainable development was skewed 
towards economic growth at the expense of social and environmental objectives, and that there was 
insufficient protection for the countryside and the environment (Campaign to Protect Rural England 
[CPRE], 2011; National Trust, 2011; Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [RSPB], 2011). There was 
much debate about what impact the presumption would have as worded in the government’s draft 
NPPF. Whereas elements of the countryside and environmental protection lobby sought to portray 
the presumption as creating a new and unwelcome emphasis on development and growth, those in 
support of the reforms sought to demonstrate that such a presumption was not new. The govern-
ment issued a planning ‘mythbuster’ document that stated: “From the birth of modern [English] 
planning in 1947 there was a presumption in favour of development” (Department for Communities 
and Local Government [DCLG], 2011b, p. 1). Conversely, the National Trust invoked the countryside 
protectionist aspect of the early English planning movement to legitimise its argument that: “The 
planning system itself has never been mandated to promote growth” (House of Commons, 
Communities and Local Government Committee, 2011, Ev 110).
The National Trust and CPRE’s tactic of framing its discourse in terms that suggested the draft 
NPPF amounted to an attack on the countryside was highly successful in winning popular support. It 
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played to a perennial and deeply culturally embedded anxiety about the relationship between town 
and country (Stevenson, 2005; Williams, 1993), particularly in Conservative rural shires. The con-
servationist lobby was therefore skilful in articulating the debate in terms to which its (and many of 
the Conservative Party’s) supporters would respond. Conversely, the government’s discursive 
reliance on the need for growth in a post-financial crisis world, and on arguments regarding whether 
there had in fact always been a presumption in favour of development in the planning system, was 
far less successful in capturing the public’s imagination. These did not have the same ideological, 
discursive and political power as the arguments deployed by the objectors.
By failing to include potential objectors effectively in the coordinative discourse shaping the 
initial draft policy, the government worsened an already potentially volatile situation. The govern-
ment had not incorporated them sufficiently as participants in the coordinative sphere in a way that 
could have helped to neutralise some of the controversies that occurred in public once the draft 
NPPF was published. This failure came close to undermining a key part of the government’s 
ideological project for planning, and demonstrates the importance of discursive strategy in the 
policymaking process. While the ensuing debate was conducted through public channels through 
communicative (and sometimes adversarial) discourse (Kirkup, 2011; Sparrow, 2011), it seemed as 
though a settlement might never be reached. The government was very much on the back foot as it 
was facing well-organised opponents who could deploy far more effective and emotive ideas that 
were deeply connected to middle class constructions of the countryside.
Such was the extent of the political problem for the government posed by the public controversy 
that the Prime Minister had to get directly involved. Cameron wrote a letter to the National Trust 
that was published in the Telegraph newspaper on 20 September 2011. In it, Cameron recognised 
the “need for a balance” between the “environmental and social dimensions as well as an economic 
dimension” of sustainable development (Winnett, 2011). This letter from Cameron marked a turning 
point. There was a further series of meetings between the government and its opponents in which 
the wording of the NPPF was discussed with a view to arriving at a compromise.
The final NPPF was published in March 2012 at the same time as the government’s response to 
a report into the draft NPPF that had been prepared by the Communities and Local Government Select 
Committee. The government accepted 30 out of 35 of the committee’s recommendations either in 
part or in full. Key changes the campaign had secured to the final NPPF included the removal of the 
reference to ‘the default answer to development proposals should be ‘yes”, adjustments to the 
discussion of sustainable development to include reference to the United Nations General Assembly 
definition of sustainable development, and an allowance for transitional arrangements to give local 
authorities time to update their local plans before the presumption in favour of sustainable develop-
ment would be given full weight in decision-making (Hope, 2012b). The final NPPF was publicly 
greeted by the National Trust and the coalition of interests of which it was a part as evidence that they 
had been listened to and that their campaign had been successful (Hope, 2012a).
The political pressure brought to bear on the government did result in changes to the NPPF to 
make it ostensibly more ‘balanced’. However, the ‘presumption in favour of sustainable develop-
ment’ remained. When interpreted in conjunction with the requirement in the NPPF for local 
authorities to plan for objectively assessed housing need and ensure that there is a five year supply 
of deliverable housing land in their areas, this could tilt the balance in favour of development on 
marginal sites and would subsequently result in many planning decisions to grant permission for 
new housing in contravention of the adopted local plan and the desires of the local planning 
authority and local community, often at appeal6 and often on greenfield land (Smith, 2017).7 In light 
of this, it is difficult to determine to what extent the public campaign actually succeeded in curbing 
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what was perceived by some to be an excessive emphasis on growth at the expense of other 
dimensions of sustainable development and localism in the draft NPPF. However, it is clear that the 
neoliberal current of the Conservative Party’s ideology, and the associated programmatic emphases 
on deregulation and development, were firmly (re)institutionalised through the NPPF and suc-
ceeded in helping to push through new housing development in the face of local opposition in 
the years immediately following the adoption of the 2012 NPPF.
The NPPF and Institutional Change
The previous analysis has explored how the various levels of ideas relevant to planning in the early 
years of the coalition government interacted to help shape a programme of planning reform of 
which the NPPF was one key output. The paper has situated this period within the longer-term 
context of the neoliberalisation of British politics which has gone through successive waves since 
the 1970s. It has briefly shown how some of the conceptual elements of the neoliberalised political 
ideology of the coalition period Conservative Party were articulated in relation to planning, and how 
this was in some ways a continuation of elements of the previous New Labour political ideology (a 
focus on planning as facilitating growth and development) and in other ways a break from it (a 
reframing of the role of the state alongside a distinctly conservative conception of community – or 
‘neighbourhood’ – that entailed a rejection of compulsory regional planning). Therefore, at the 
party-political ideological level there was continuity (connected to a broadly shared neoliberal 
orientation) as well as some significant shifts in the conceptual framing, which had implications 
for the institutional design of English planning.
There was not a clean deterministic relationship between political ideology, programme, and the 
policies that found their way into the NPPF. The NPPF policymaking process was characterised by 
ideological struggle as the government sought to legitimise its contradictory programme in the face 
of opposition. However, despite the spectacle of the public debate, concessions were secured that 
did not, in the end, prevent large amounts of un-planned housing on greenfield land being 
permitted. The NPPF was not fundamentally transformed or abandoned because of the consultation 
and ensuing debate. A key reason for this was that, although apparently highly adversarial at times, 
the terms of the dominant public oppositional discourse were very far from radical. The govern-
ment’s opponents were mainly ‘small-c’ conservative voices calling for an adjustment to the draft 
NPPF in the interest of environmental and landscape protection (and, perhaps, protection of house 
prices). There was no serious challenge to the fundamental political assumptions that shaped the 
document. The controversy was therefore more a symptom of the internal tensions in the ideology 
of the Conservative Party at the time – and the ideological flexibility of planning itself (Foley, 1960) – 
combined with the discursive strategies of the government that did not effectively manage these 
tensions. Such tensions have not gone away and the NPPF has been revised three times in the 
intervening period (once in 2018 and twice in 2019), with further proposed changes being consulted 
on at the time of writing. However, these further revisions have not generated much attention 
outside specialist circles, perhaps because they represented an adjustment to existing policy 
settings rather than the apparently more significant change the original NPPF represented.
In any case, the 2012 NPPF policymaking process is a good example of how ideas alone are not 
enough to explain institutional change – the design of the policymaking process, the nature of and 
relations between the ideas, and how they are communicated and by whom are, of course, 
significant factors also. By exploring this process, this paper has examined the messy realities that 
can characterise the institutionalisation of planning reform to add further detail to existing analyses 
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that examine the abstract relationship between ideas and institutional change in planning. A further 
level of complexity that is not examined here is at the level of implementation – local planners do 
have a degree of autonomy that can further challenge and exploit ambiguities in ideologically- 
informed national or regional programmes (Clifford, 2020).
So how much did the institution of planning change in this early coalition government period? 
When using a discursive institutionalist framework, it all depends on which level of ideas change 
occurs and to what degree. The case was made above for differentiating between a ‘background’ 
ideational context such as neoliberalism and the particular political ideologies of political parties 
within a broader neoliberalised context. In this way of seeing things, although the particular political 
ideology of the Conservative Party was distinct from that of New Labour as it related to planning, it 
did not usher in a ‘paradigm shift’. There were broad continuities that were connected to a shared 
neoliberalised orientation, such as the ongoing focus on adjusting the institutional design of 
planning so that it can facilitate growth alongside a disciplining of planning and planners.
However, there were sufficient differences in the political ideology of the Conservative Party 
compared with New Labour to legitimise change through the ‘recasting’ of policy instruments, 
accompanied by adjustments to the programmatic objectives. The abolition of statutory regional 
planning (outside of London) and the introduction of non-compulsory neighbourhood planning, 
alongside the moves instituted via the NPPF, were all programmatic adjustments. However, these 
were not accompanied by a revolutionary shift in framing as to what planning is for and what it is 
supposed to achieve – it continued to be presented as being able to achieve multiple objectives but 
with a key focus on housing delivery with its perceived failings being used to legitimise further 
reform.
The growth-focused reforms therefore partly represented the continuation of what cultural 
theorist Stuart Hall called the ‘hegemonic project’ of neoliberalism. However, this is not to suggest 
that any such project can be complete. Following Gramsci (1971), Hall argued that hegemony is “a 
process, not a state of being” and “has constantly to be ‘worked on’, maintained, renewed, revised” 
(Hall, 2017b, p. 334). Ideology has a key role to play in this process – it acts to close down debate, to 
obfuscate contradictions and to exert interpretive control over understandings of what problems 
need to be addressed and how to address them. It can thus help to maintain, renew and revise 
a dominant hegemonic project when challenged, but can also organise opposition to it. As the NPPF 
policymaking process demonstrates, planning was a key site for ideological contestation where 
potential challenges to the Conservative Party ideology, and the contingent hegemonic project it 
helped renew, played out. However, because the politics and ideological articulations of the most 
powerful challenges were far from radical, and the range of acceptable ideas was policed by the 
ideological framework of the Conservative-led coalition government, opposition was at that time 
contained within acceptable limits.
However, there have been signs over the last decade that the hegemonic project of neoliber-
alism is faltering in parts of the global North, fracturing under the pressure of political, economic, 
environmental and social crises. These have been marked by a destabilising questioning of masses 
of people of the ‘reigning common sense’ as manifested in the rise of populisms across the 
political spectrum (Fraser, 2019). According to some (Rugitsky, 2020; Stahl, 2019), this period of 
crises corresponds to what Gramsci (1971) called an ‘interregnum’ in which “the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born” and during which “a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (p. 276). 
These crises have now been compounded by the global impact of the emergence of novel form of 
coronavirus in winter 2019 which brought morbid symptoms of its own. As we now move into 
a post-covid-19 political economy, whereby the relations between the state, the economy and 
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individual liberty are being further rearticulated, it remains to be seen in what form (if any) the 
neoliberal project will continue across spaces and scales and what roles planning will play in 
relation to the political ideologies of those struggling to secure a new political, social and 
economic order.
Conclusion
This paper has used a discursive institutionalist framework, combined with a morphological under-
standing of political ideology, to trace the process of the institutionalisation of the 2012 NPPF in England, 
and through it the role of discourse in influencing and shaping this element of the coalition planning 
policy reforms. By doing so, the paper makes three contributions that are of broader relevance beyond 
the confines of this case study and the English context. Firstly, by drawing a sharper distinction than is 
typical in the institutionalist literature between the ‘background’ level of ideas (such as more or less 
hegemonic forms of neoliberalism) and the conceptual morphologies of the ideologies of particular 
political parties, the analysis explores how differing ideological traditions can meld with neoliberal 
impulses in different ways to produce differing institutional articulations of neoliberalised planning 
reform. This framework therefore offers a way to think through the degree of continuity and change in 
different periods of planning reform and how these relate to the faltering hegemonic status of 
neoliberalism, the particular ideological traditions of political parties and how these meld to influence 
the framing of the problems that need to be addressed in planning. This approach has the potential to 
be used in analyses of the history of planning reform in different political cultures and could be profitably 
deployed in comparative studies to explore the relationship between variegated forms of neoliberalised 
planning and the political ideological contexts in different countries.
Secondly, while the paper explores how the programmatic and policy ideas comprising a period 
of planning reform are related to the political ideology of the political party or parties promoting the 
reform agenda, by focusing on the discursive interactions comprising the policymaking process, the 
paper explores how ideology does not unproblematically legitimise such reform. It is important to 
pay attention to the structure and nature of the associated coordinative and communicative 
discourse to trace how various ideological elements find their way into policy in what can be 
a difficult process. This is a key contribution of the deployment of a discursive institutionalist 
framework – the acknowledgement that ideas matter and that ideological and programmatic 
arrangements can have a strong influence on policy, but that the way in which such ideas are 
communicated and to whom is also of fundamental importance and can mean the difference 
between success and failure in the adoption of a policy programme.
Thirdly, by paying attention to the discursive interactions in the policymaking process and how 
these relate to the morphology of the political ideology of the party or parties promoting planning 
reform, the analysis explores the many roles ideology can play in this process. The paper has shown 
how ideology can seek to legitimise reform even in the face of obvious contradiction, ‘suture 
together’ such contradiction, close down debate when an ideological project is being challenged, 
and exert interpretive control over the terms in which the debate is being conducted. However, 
crucially, it has also been shown that ideology cuts both ways – it can serve to organise resistance to, 
as well as support for, a dominant political project.
These contributions have implications for international planning practitioners who are working in 
the context of neoliberalised planning. Firstly, the analytical framework deployed in this paper can 
be used by practitioners to think through the ideological and political dimensions of planning 
reform to better understand how deeply political and contestable ideas act to fix the terms by which 
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planning is understood and to what ends it is practiced. Secondly, and related to the first point, the 
account presented in this paper should remind practitioners that the neoliberalisation of planning is 
not inevitable or unending – these seemingly dominant ideas are deeply contestable after all. In the 
context of the crises we collectively face, there is potential for ideological and communicative work 
to be done by those who would like to see a positive vision of planning take its place as part of a new 
political paradigm. Although often deeply compromised, planning still has the potential to be a site 
of progressive change that can work with and reshape the market rather than be framed somehow 
in opposition to it. However, for this to be achieved, it would need to be actively promoted via 
a clearly articulated set of values and a corresponding vision for the positive role planning can play 
as part of a wider strategy of transforming the hegemonic political project of neoliberalism.
Notes
1. Others have used the terms constructivist institutionalism and ideational institutionalism (Hay, 2011; 
Moon, 2013). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will use the term discursive institutionalism to 
refer to all such forms of institutionalist analysis that share a focus on the “affective role of ideas” in 
constituting institutions and influencing change (Moon, 2013, p. 112).
2. Although, as pointed out by Hay (2011), interests are themselves revealed through ideas.
3. This section comprises a brief summary of more thorough accounts provided in Shepherd (2018, 2020).
4. This is not to argue that a focus on growth through housebuilding is intrinsically ‘neoliberal’ – after all, as 
pointed out by a reviewer for this paper, growth through development also meshes with a broadly 
Keynesian economic paradigm. However, the emphasis on growth through the development of new 
housing primarily via private enterprise (rather than directly by the state) with a focus on home own-
ership (rather than to meet a broader range of housing needs via social housing) alongside the critique of 
planning as being slow, bureaucratic and getting in the way of an efficient market made the growth 
focused discourse of the time neoliberal in character.
5. See also Slade (2018) for an excellent and detailed account of the 2012 NPPF policymaking process.
6. In England, planning appeals against local refusals of planning permission are decided by the Planning 
Inspectorate, an executive agency sponsored by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (formerly DCLG) and the Welsh Government.
7. There is evidence that the success rate of such adversarial strategies has declined in recent years due to 
planning inspectors according more weight to the landscape impacts of new greenfield housing 
development at appeal (Dewar, 2020).
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